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WHOM SHOULD A CATHOLIC LAW SCHOOL
HONOR? IF CONFUSION IS THE CONCERN,
CONTEXT MATTERS
ROBERT K. VISCHERt
If a Catholic can vote for a pro-choice candidate when
proportionate reasons justify that decision, can a Catholic law
school honor a pro-choice public figure if there are proportionate
reasons to do so? In other words, should the law school's inquiry
focus simply on whether the honoree defies Church teaching on
any matter of grave moral importance, or should the law school
also consider the message communicated by the honoree in light
of the broader context in which it would be extended? This short
Essay suggests that a contextual approach is more consistent
with the U.S. Bishops' instruction on this matter and avoids
some of the collateral harm arising from a bright-line prohibition
on honoring anyone who defies even a single aspect of Church
teaching.
In what has become an annual rite of spring, the selection of
commencement speakers serves as a convenient focal point for
broader debates about the institutional identity and fidelity of
Catholic colleges and universities. Although the debates'
occurrence may have become perfectly predictable, the tenor and
direction of the debates have displayed widely varying capacities
to spur a renewed sense of mission on campus. The most readily
discernible legacies of these episodes are as likely to be ad
hominem attacks and divisive rhetoric as they are to include the
reframing of institutional priorities and commitments. The
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops ("USCCB") has
provided a guideline for the commencement decisions, but its
seeming simplicity renders it susceptible to being applied in a
way that ignores context and closes off conversation. The
bishops, in Catholics in Political Life, cautioned that "[t]he
t Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of St.
Thomas Law School (Minnesota). Thanks to Teresa Collett, Lisa Schiltz, Susan
Stabile, and Amy Uelmen for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Essay.
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Catholic community and Catholic institutions should not honor
those who act in defiance of our fundamental moral principles.
They should not be given awards, honors or platforms which
suggest support for their actions."'
The first sentence, applied without the second sentence,
creates tension with the guidance offered elsewhere by the
bishops about Catholics' participation in public life. If the sole
criterion for whether a person may be honored by a Catholic
institution is whether she has acted "in defiance of our
fundamental moral principles," then the disqualification turns
simply on whether the person takes a position that conflicts with
any such principle. This stringent standard makes sense if the
guideline's objective is to ensure that honorees are in full
agreement with the Church. It is not apparent, though, why that
would or should be the objective.
John Paul II explained that "each Catholic University makes
an important contribution to the Church's work of
evangelization" as a "living institutional witness to Christ and
his message," and thus "all the basic academic activities of a
Catholic University are connected with and in harmony with the
evangelizing mission of the Church."' If the concern underlying
the bishops' guideline centers on the evangelizing capacity of
Catholic institutions, then the guideline's objective would be to
avoid the confusion that can compromise that capacity. Note
that this confusion is not about the Church's authority but about
moral truth. This is why Father John Jenkins, Notre Dame's
President, was misguided when he argued, in defense of his
invitation to President Obama to serve as commencement
speaker, that "[b]ecause the title of the document is 'Catholics in
Political Life,' we understood this to refer to honoring Catholics
whose actions are not in accord with our moral principles,"3 and
that "only Catholics who implicitly recognize the authority of
UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Catholics in Political Life
(2004) (emphasis omitted), available at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/catholicsin
politicallife.shtml.
2 JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION EX CORDE ECCLESIAE 1 49 (1990)
(emphasis omitted), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii
/apostsconstitutions/documents/hf jp-ii apc_15081990_ex-corde-ecclesiae en.html.
' Joseph Bottum, And the War Came, FIRST THINGS: MONTHLY J. RELIGION &
PUB. LIFE, June/July 2009, at 63, 65.
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Church teaching can act in 'defiance' of it."4  The Church's
teaching aims at all persons of good will, not just Catholics. The
truths proclaimed therein are binding not by virtue of some
ecclesiastical jurisdiction but because they are true. The fact
that an honoree is not Catholic may reduce the level of scandal
caused by the defiance but does not preclude the possibility that
disagreement with Church teaching constitutes defiance.
But should defiance on a particular issue necessarily
preclude honoring a person? After all, the Church trusts the
individual voter to make a prudent assessment of context in
casting a vote for a candidate who defies Church teaching, even
on a matter as fundamental as abortion rights. As part of the
process that resulted in the Catholics in Political Life statement,
for example, Cardinal Theodore McCarrick offered the reminder
that "when a Catholic does not share a candidate's stand in favor
of abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for
other reasons," it is permissible if the reasons "are
proportionate."' Similarly, in their 2007 statement, Forming
Consciences for Faithful Citizenship, the bishops reminded
Catholics that "a voter should not use a candidate's opposition to
an intrinsic evil to justify indifference or inattentiveness to other
important moral issues involving human life and dignity,"' and
that "[t]here may be times when a Catholic who rejects a
candidate's unacceptable position may decide to vote for that
candidate for other morally grave reasons."
This "proportionate reasoning" analysis is an awkward fit at
the institutional level, though. Cardinal Ratzinger explained, in
the context of individual voters, that
[a] Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in evil, and so
unworthy to present himself for Holy Communion, if he were to
deliberately vote for a candidate precisely because of the
candidate's permissive stand on abortion and/or euthanasia.
4 Margaret Fosmoe, Is ND Catholic Enough?, SOUTH BEND TRIB., May 10, 2009,
at Al.
5 UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Interim Reflections Task
Force on Catholic Bishops and Catholic Politicians (2004), available at
http://www.usccb.org/bishops/intreflections.shtml.
6 UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Forming Consciences for
Faithful Citizenship 11 (2007) [hereinafter Forming Consciences], available at
http://www.usccb.org/faithfulcitizenship/FCStatement.pdf.
7 Id.
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When a Catholic does not share a candidate's stand in favour of
abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for
other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation,
which can be permitted in the presence of proportionate
reasons.8
The hard part, of course, is figuring out what constitutes a
proportionate reason that would justify voting for a pro-choice
candidate. Some bishops do not believe such reasons exist,' but
others appear open to the possibility.o In the end, this question
must be answered by the voter herself. As the bishops of
Virginia explained, a person is obligated to "seek the 'mind of
Christ'" in her voting judgments, but ultimately, the assessment
of proportionality "is a matter for the individual conscience.""
At the institutional level, it is not as simple as trusting the
voter's intent. Voting is a moral obligation for individual
Catholics;12 honoring public figures is not a moral obligation for
Catholic institutions. If a Catholic law school chooses to bestow
an honor, the bishops are understandably concerned about
muddled institutional messages. Because of the public nature of
the institutional honor, there is a real potential for harm
stemming from confusion caused by even a well-intentioned
decision to extend an honor. The sin of scandal refers to "an
attitude or behavior which leads another to do evil" 3 and
8 Memorandum from Cardinal Ratzinger to Cardinal McCarrick, Worthiness To
Receive Holy Communion (July 2004), available at http://www.priestsforlife.org/
magisterium/bishops/04-07ratzingerommunion.htm.
9 See, e.g., ARCHBISHOP JOSEPH F. NAUMANN & BISHOP ROBERT W. FINN, JOINT
PASTORAL LETTER, OUR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AS CATHOLIC CITIZENS (Sept. 12,
2008), available at http://www.diocese-kcsj.org/_docs/JointPastoral-Moral-Cons-09-
08.pdf ("[Wie cannot conceive of such a proportionate reason [to justify voting for a
pro-choice candidate].").
10 See, e.g., Greg Kalscheur, S.J., Catholics in Public Life: Judges, Legislators,
and Voters, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 211, 236 (2007) ("[I1f a Catholic voted for a
candidate despite his or her pro-choice stance, it would not necessarily be sinful.")
(alteration in original) (quoting then-Archbishop Levada) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
n Bishop Paul Loverde & Bishop Francis DiLorenzo, The Voter's Responsibility,
35 ORIGINS 370, 371 (2005) (quoted in Gregory A. Kalscheur, Catholics in Public
Life: Judges, Legislators, and Voters, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 211, 236-37 (2007)).
12 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2240 (2d ed. 1997) ("Submission to
authority and co-responsibility for the common good make it morally
obligatory .. . to exercise the right to vote . . .
1 Id. 1 2284.
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typically "operates by giving a bad example."" If a Catholic law
school honors an abortion rights advocate, there is a danger of
scandal-in that students and other observers will be led to
conclude that, if the school is willing to honor that person,
abortion must not be a grave moral evil, or at least that
opposition to legalized abortion is not of pressing importance. As
Bishop John D'Arcy asked during the controversy over Notre
Dame's decision to honor President Obama:
In its decision to give its highest honor to a president who has
repeatedly opposed even the smallest legal protection of the
child in the womb, did Notre Dame surrender the responsibility
that Pope Benedict believes Catholic universities have to give
public witness to the truths revealed by God and taught by the
Church?.
It is not obvious why every honor extended to a person who
favors abortion rights would amount to a surrendering of this
public witness. Unless we are willing to conclude that a Catholic
law school's failure to treat the honoree's views on abortion as
dispositive is categorically equivalent to such a surrender, there
are many instances where the honor is unlikely to amount to
"scandal" because the honoree is overwhelmingly associated with
work through which the Gospel is proclaimed.
If avoiding confusion in the law school's public witness is the
objective, then the second sentence of the guideline is key: the
honor should not "suggest support for [the honoree's] actions"
that are in defiance of Church teaching. The second sentence can
and should be interpreted to permit an honor in the presence of
proportionate reasons, tailored to the risk of scandal that
accompanies the public nature of institutional honors. A
Catholic law school should never honor a person because of their
actions that defy the Church's teaching. A Catholic law school
may honor a person despite their actions that defy the Church's
teaching but only if the circumstances are such that the honor is
unlikely to cause observers to question the school's commitment
to the truth of the Church's teaching. In other words, if
confusion is the concern, context matters.
" Edward A. Hartnett, Catholic Judges and Cooperation in Sin, 4 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 221, 237 (2006).
" John M. D'Arcy, The Church and the University, AMERICA, Aug. 31-Sept. 7,
2009, at 13, 14.
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Simplistic, single-issue approaches to institutional identity
can spawn their own confusion. When an unmistakably Catholic
college is forbidden from honoring a public figure who has
unmistakably contributed to the common good, but who disagrees
with Church teaching on a single issue, there is a danger of
confusion to Catholics and non-Catholics alike regarding the
expansive range of the moral issues of concern to the Church. If
a tireless advocate against the death penalty, such as Sister
Helen Prejean, is disqualified from serving as a commencement
speaker because she has made questionable statements
regarding the legal treatment of abortion,'" there is a real danger
that the public will conclude that the Church's focus is so narrow
that it excludes acknowledgement of productive, counter-cultural
work in other areas.
In Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship, the bishops
cautioned that "[t]wo temptations in public life can distort the
Church's defense of human life and dignity."" The first "is a
moral equivalence that makes no ethical distinctions between
different kinds of issues involving human life and dignity."'" We
must remember that the "direct and intentional destruction of
innocent human life from the moment of conception until natural
death is always wrong and is not just one issue among many.""
The second temptation, though,
is the misuse of these necessary moral distinctions as a way of
dismissing or ignoring other serious threats to human life and
dignity. Racism and other unjust discrimination, the use of the
death penalty, resorting to unjust war, the use of torture, war
crimes, the failure to respond to those who are suffering from
hunger or a lack of health care, or an unjust immigration policy
are all serious moral issues that challenge our consciences and
require us to act. These are not optional concerns which can be
dismissed.2 0
" See, e.g., Pamela Schaeffer, Harrisburg Bishop Bows out of Anti-Death Penalty
Event Featuring Sr. Helen Prejean, NAT'L CATH. REP., Feb. 28, 1997, at 3 (reporting
on an interview in which Sr. Prejean had commented that she regards abortion as
"much more complex than a mere choice" and that "to answer the abortion question
so that women don't have them, we really have to look seriously at the whole thing
of birth control, family planning and not having unwanted pregnancies").
" Forming Consciences, supra note 6, at 9.
18 Id.
19 Id.
2 Id.
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If the overarching concern is maintaining the distinctive
Catholic witness of Catholic institutions and if that distinctive
witness must not ignore the panoply of "serious moral issues that
challenge our consciences and require us to act," then the
implementation of the bishops' guideline requires a more
nuanced and intensive account than identifying a single-issue
conflict between the honoree and Church teaching. We must ask
whether the honor suggests, under the circumstances, support
for the honoree's defiant actions.
If the permissible honoree inquiry excludes a proportionate
reasons analysis, we lose the opportunity to draw distinctions
among the vast number of potential honorees who do not abide
by all of the Church's moral teachings. Would a Catholic law
school's decision to honor pro-choice President Carter in 1977
pose a different risk of confusion than honoring pro-choice
President Obama in 2009? Should honoring either President be
treated as equivalent to honoring someone like Frances Kissling,
who is known only for her defiance of Church teaching on
abortion? What about timing? Would honoring pro-choice
President Carter pose a different level of concern than
honoring-still pro-choice-former President Carter, now known
widely for his post-Presidency work promoting affordable
housing? Is Notre Dame's decision to honor President Obama in
the months after several of his most controversial sanctity-of-life
decisions more problematic than if the honor was delayed for a
year or two? 2 1
Further, the failure to consider context also precludes
distinctions among the honoring institutions. If we are
concerned with confusion, the message communicated by the
honor can only be understood in light of the school's overarching
witness to the truth of the Church's teaching. Take, for example,
the decision by Xavier University in New Orleans to invite
Donna Brazile, the first African American to lead a national
presidential campaign, to speak at commencement. Would any
2 See Rick Garnett, More on Commencement Speakers/Response to Rob,
MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Mar. 23, 2009, 7:13 PM), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/
mirrorofjustice/2009/03/more-on-commencement-speakers-response-to-rob.html ("I
am not ruling out the possibility that Notre Dame could invite President Obama to
speak at graduation.... But now? There is no way to avoid the impression, given
the recent stem-cell and abortion-related decisions, that Notre Dame is un-bothered
by these deeply unjust actions.").
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reasonable observer believe that Xavier-the only historically
Black Catholic university in the Western Hemisphere-invited
Brazile to speak because she is pro-choice? Would an observer
associate the honor in any significant way with Brazile's views on
the legalization of abortion?22 Or would the honor be viewed as
keeping with the university founder's call to "her church and her
nation to be true to the gospel and to the Bill of Rights"?2 3
More fundamentally, though, the institutional context
matters, not just as a descriptive reality, but as a normative
claim, because in the long run, identity flourishes more through
proactive witness than through omission. If a university aims to
be true to the bishops' objective, the university needs to carry out
its responsibility as a public witness. It should not be as simple
as maintaining a "do not honor" list; that can be a relatively
costless exercise, and while it might avoid confusing the school's
message, it does not substitute for the message itself. Notre
Dame, for example, has made strong institutional commitments
to pro-life causes over the years,2 4 and those commitments
directly shape the perception of the honors the university
extends.
A contextual approach is far from straightforward, to be
sure. Our evaluation of the weight afforded to an honoree's
witness notwithstanding the issue on which she defies Church
teaching is likely to turn, to some extent, on the weight we afford
to that issue itself. For many Catholics, no amount of good
facilitated by the work of an anti-death penalty crusader or
advocate for the poor can outweigh the harm of their pro-choice
views. Nor, under this view, could an institution's robust
Catholic identity on other issues mitigate the scandal occasioned
by honoring such a person. Other Catholics may use a contextual
approach to focus on the Church teachings that best comport
with their own political and ideological preferences, allowing
them to downplay the importance of teachings that do not easily
22 See Bruce Nolan & John Pope, Hughes Snubs Xavier Graduation Ceremony;
University Honors Woman, Supporter of Abortion Rights, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Apr. 24, 2009, at 1.
23 Xavier University Mission, www.xula.edulmission/fullstory.php (last visited
Mar. 28, 2011).
2 See, e.g., Fund to Protect Human Life, NOTRE DAME CTR. FOR ETHICS AND
CULTURE, https://sites.google.comla/nd.edu/the-notre-dame-center-for-ethics-and-
culture/fund-to-protect-human-life (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
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fit with their own priorities. In other words, does a contextual
approach simply bring "cafeteria Catholicism" to the law school's
selection of a commencement speaker?
Admittedly, evaluations of context will be subjective, but
some subjectivity on the question of scandal is unavoidable.
Including context holds promise for the honoree inquiry because
it expects institutional actors to consider Catholic witness-that
of both the honored individual and the honoring institution-as a
whole. Under a single-issue approach, Catholic institutions are
placed in a position of either (1) unnecessarily curtailing their
capacity to honor lives that contribute to the common good,
thereby risking a different sort of scandal by portraying the
culture-transforming scope of Church teaching in misleadingly
narrow terms or (2) ignoring the guideline as an impractical and
onerous imposition, which creates its own scandal by openly
rejecting the bishops' teaching authority. A contextual approach
expands the options.
There is nothing wrong with viewing the honoring of a pro-
choice figure as a prima facie case of scandal, but the ultimate
conclusion must demonstrate more than a single identifiable
conflict between Church teaching and the honoree's position.
Critics of the honor should, in keeping with the bishops'
guideline, explain why the honor compromises the institution's
witness under the circumstances. By the same token, the
institution should be prepared to explain why the honoree's life
and work merit recognition, and why the point of conflict with
Church teaching does not compromise the institutional witness.
Grounding the objection in the particular factual
circumstances-the lived witness of the honoree, the
demonstrated commitments of the institution, and the status of
the disputed teaching in the surrounding culture-can serve as
an invitation to deeper conversation and an impetus to identity-
enhancing action.
In the debates surrounding commencement speakers, there
is a temptation to wield the first sentence of the bishops'
guideline like a hammer, pounding any institution that honors a
person who holds views that depart from Church teaching. The
Cardinal Newman Society exemplifies this approach, regularly
2512010]
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compiling a list of offending institutions.2 5 In 2009, the Society
challenged Saint Vincent College's selection of Senator Robert
Casey as commencement speaker because, though Casey is
widely hailed as one of the few pro-life elected officials in the
Democratic Party, he "has stated his support of federal funding
for contraceptives," "supported the legalization of homosexual
civil unions," and endorsed Barack Obama for President.26
Utilized in these terms, the guideline functions as a conversation
stopper. The second sentence of the guideline brings context into
the inquiry. Especially when the inquiry includes not just the
overarching work and public perception of the honoree but also
the overarching identity and commitments of the institution, the
bishops' guideline can spark a productive conversation about
what it means to be an institutional witness to truth in a culture
that appears increasingly committed to truth as a subjective
construct of the individual.
25 See, e.g., In Aftermath of Notre Dame Controversy, Catholic College
Commencement Scandals Decline in 2010, CARDINAL NEWMAN SOc'Y,
http://www.cardinalnewmansociety.org/CardinalNewmanSociety/tabid/36/ctl/Details/
mid/435/ltemlD/824/Default.aspx (last updated June 21, 2010).
26 Saint Vincent '09 Commencement Speaker Is Bob Casey Jr., CARDINAL
NEWMAN SOC'Y (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.cardinalnewmansociety.org/Campus
SpeakerMonitoring/tabid/64/ctl/Details/mid/463/ItemID/321/Default.aspx.
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